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HOW ALLIES COLLABORATE: THE NATO TRAINING EXPERIENCE

Brigadier General H. Vandevanter, Jr., USAF (Ret)

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PREFACE

Some recent military alliances have been characterized as new species because of their extensive peacetime organization and activity. Attitudes differ widely regarding the nature and effectiveness of regional organizations like NATO; empirical research on them has been skimpy. This Memorandum adds to our meager fund of data on one aspect of NATO activities and, at the same time, relates experience in this single area, in a tentative way, to our theoretical understanding of how allies act toward each other.

The author, Brigadier General Elliott Vandevanter, Jr. (USAF, Ret.), wrote this study while a resident consultant in the Washington Office of The RAND Corporation. This is his fifth in a series of Memoranda dealing with allied collaboration and decision-making in NATO. (Previous studies are listed in the References.) He gathered the material for this survey from press reports, unclassified NATO documents, semi-official publications, and numerous interviews.

The research for the study is part of a continuing program concerning NATO's future prospects, undertaken by The RAND Corporation for U.S. Air Force Project RAND.

SUMMARY

This paper surveys fifteen years of NATO experience (1950 to 1965) in coordinating the training of the military forces of the allies. Because results have differed substantially, depending on who or what was being trained, the training experience has been analyzed under three headings, dealing with: (1) "higher training," or the coordination of large military formations; (2) teaching groups to operate as teams, known as "unit training"; and (3) specialized "individual training."

International leaders have achieved notable success in the realm of "higher training" where their mandate is more sure. Military formations of member countries have been taught to operate harmoniously with those of neighboring allies. Exercises and maneuvers have increased steadily in both number and sophistication. Commanders of national forces routinely submit themselves to the control of international commanders during periods of active maneuvering.

By contrast, in the field of "unit" and "individual" training, international direction of activities has been attempted only spasmodically and with limited objectives. In this category the member states hold primary responsibility. Originally, the allies were uncertain whether to centralize activities under international stewardship or to retain their separate programs. The question has been solved pragmatically; members have continued on their independent ways. Even where they have seen fit to coordinate with neighbors, they have usually worked directly with the other partners rather than through the central offices of NATO.

In consequence, NATO officials have slackened their efforts to stimulate collaboration in the training of units and individuals. This is not to say that there is less cooperation today than there used to be. It merely means that the central apparatus has less to do with it. Many procedures for collaboration have been established and now operate almost automatically. Some uniform procedures have been introduced mechanically as common weapons were procured by groups of allies. The simple, inexpensive adjustments that could

be made in the interest of uniformity have already been accomplished. The remaining ones, in the eyes of the members who would have to implement them, would entail an effort disproportionate to the benefits that would accrue.

Although NATO operates a few combined institutions for unit and individual training, the scope of this activity falls far below what was once perceived as a major function of the international structure. Consolidated international training has not proved to be as economical or as regenerative as its earlier advocates expected. This view seems to be confirmed by the gradual shift of SHAPE personnel away from training assignments.

The Organization and Training Division of SHAPE, once among the most prestigious elements of the staff, has virtually passed from existence. Those staff sections of international institutions that are still identified with training are concerned primarily with exercises and maneuvers.

The inability of the international commanders to deal authoritatively with the training problem does not detract from the valuable service they have rendered. On the contrary, although legally impotent, they have often been able to persuade nations to cooperate, and this attests to the quality of their leadership. Without the guidance of the international structure, particularly in the field of upper echelon training, Western European defenses would probably still be composed of disjointed national contingents.

As to the reasons why nations have not collaborated more extensively in unit and individual training, the monetary savings from collectivization do not approach the amounts that the enthusiasts have generally assumed. Economies of scale taper off at a relatively early stage. Language presents an obstacle in any combined program. Transportation costs to central facilities also eat away at potential savings. Standards of living, pay scales, and disciplinary procedures vary so widely throughout the alliance that any community institution faces a multitude of annoying administrative problems.

Some collective efforts are frustrated in the negotiation stage. One or two nations will hold tenaciously to extreme positions

hoping that the others will have to meet their unreasonable conditions. Some national authorities hold training in low regard and prefer to keep it completely under country jurisdiction where it can be expanded or contracted on national initiatives. Nations often fear a loss of foreign exchange through international programs. The few successful cases of consolidation have come about primarily as a result of scarcity in some essential commodity such as training equipment or land for a missile range.

If the act of forming an alliance creates a spirit of willingness to make sacrifices for the common welfare, the spirit is a weak one. National self-interest describes most accurately the guiding principle of national behavior. Member states have usually collaborated with each other when it suited them and have declined to cooperate when called upon to make sacrifices, or even to be satisfied with less profit than others. National interest has taken precedence over community welfare and, even where they have decided to collaborate, member states have continued to compete vigorously with each other.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper has a dual purpose: first, to accumulate and codify data on NATO's experience in the military training field and, second, to probe this experience in order to learn more about how nations act in alliances.* The first objective is straightforward and requires no elaboration. The second could be approached in a number of ways; it calls for an explanation of the method of investigation. Let us take as the fundamental question, "Why do allies cooperate with one another -- or conversely, why do they fail to act in unison?"

The "community"** theorists have probed various aspects of the life cycle of alliances. They have enriched our understanding of such matters as how and why alliances are created, what their size should be, what holds them together, and why some are permanent and others only temporary. They have identified numerous coalescing factors: an external threat, cultural or religious affinity, commercial ties, geographical propinquity, and ideology.

The community school assumes "a fundamental human propensity (or even 'natural tendency') to engage in collective (group) behavior."*** The community scholars do not believe, of course, that allies always act harmoniously. But they treat the disposition to act in unison as a basic quality and they presume it to apply at any given moment to all activities of the alliance.

The "power-politics" school contains many subclasses. But

* This survey is confined to military activities. An interesting booklet explaining NATO educational endeavors in the scientific field has recently been published. See Ref. 1.

** The terminology used here is adopted from a concise comparison by Gerald Garvey. See Ref. 2. A number of studies relating to alliance theory are listed in the References.

*** Majak attributes this attitude to what he calls the "traditionalist" school, but it is clear that the views of this group are characteristic of Garvey's community philosophy. See Ref. 3.

all factions regard alliances as flexible associations in which a member's attitude toward cooperation with his partners may vary at any one time over a range of inclinations, each of which depends on the issue being considered. Power-politics scholars believe that, even in alliances, nations are motivated primarily by considerations of self-interest.

The power-politics concept does not, of course, deny that nations collaborate on occasion; it even recognizes that the alliance machinery may be useful in leading the way to mutually beneficial harmony. But theorists of this persuasion "reject the notion of conscience, goodwill, dedication to the common good, or subservience to a socially manipulated consensus on welfare questions, as possessing little consistent reality in living politics."^{*}

The difference between the two schools hinges on emphasis: the community man expects cooperation; the advocate of power politics expects competition.

We must take care not to exaggerate the applicability of the lessons of this investigation. We are looking at a microcosm, at best; it may or may not be representative. Training is only one facet of the overall integrative process. By limiting ourselves to lessons drawn from experience, however, we may be able to make a small inroad into a subject that is unmanageable in its entirety.

The concept of "public good" also contributes to the theory of alliances. A public good is something which, once produced, cannot be denied to any member of a group, whether or not he has helped to pay for it.^{**} An anti-aircraft missile site constructed in Germany from the common infrastructure fund is a public good insofar as Paris is concerned because it helps protect the French

* Haas attributes this view to "utilitarianism." See Ref. 4, p. 34. From his description, however, it appears that utilitarianism is either synonymous with the power-politics belief, or closely related. Talcott Parsons explicitly links them for us when he states that the Hobbesian theory of men at war against one another is pure utilitarianism. See Ref. 5, p. 90.

** The definitive work on this subject is Olson. See Ref. 6.

from a Soviet air attack even though France no longer contributes to the NATO account that finances the construction. As Malcom Hoag has pointed out, a nation in an alliance is impelled to underestimate the benefit it would derive from a public-good project so that its share of the common cost may be as small as possible.* This tendency to unload one's share of the common burden, if followed by several partners, acts as a powerful deterrent to community action.

Training, however, produces almost exclusively "private goods" -- products of collective action such that beneficiaries can be charged pro rata, according to how much each one gains. The principal payoff to nations that participate in a common NATO training venture is the improved efficiency of their soldiers who have received instruction. In a parallel case, France would not be allowed to send trainees to a community school unless it agreed to pay a proportionate share of the upkeep.**

It would seem that, as the nature of the community product travels across the continuum from a pure public good toward a pure private good, collective action would become easier to generate, for nations would have less incentive to belittle the benefits they would receive. Does the training experience bear out this hypothesis?

This brings us to one other thesis regarding cooperation: "functionalism." Operationally, the functionalist agrees with the power-politics theorist that nations act selfishly. But philosophically, he believes, with the community school, that collective action is inherently good and that, furthermore, the spirit of cooperation can be generated by practice in noncontroversial areas.***

* See Ref. 7.

** It must be acknowledged that in almost any venture there is a public-good component. That is to say, France gains to a certain extent from a common school, whether it participates or not, by virtue of the fact that German soldiers will be better trained and hence more efficient in providing common security. Nonetheless, relatively speaking, for training projects the private-good aspect far outweighs the public.

*** The leading exponent of functionalist theory is probably

Training seems to offer a test vehicle for functionalist theory. In many projects it would seem that the standardization and economies of scale that could be achieved through coordinating efforts would establish the ideal functionalist milieu in which everyone profits at no one's expense. The test will not be definitive, however, for if the nations fail to collaborate when conditions look propitious, the functionalist will ascribe this failure to overriding "political" costs. We shall want to learn more about these political aspects.

A quick survey of NATO training activity reveals that results have differed according to the kind of training being conducted. With regard to who or what was being trained, therefore, we shall have to study separately the history of individual, unit, and higher echelon training. Individual training requires schooling in a specialty; unit proficiency comes from harmonizing individuals through set procedures and practice in working as a team; higher training involves the coordination of large formations from different services and nations.

David Mitrany. The most objective analyst is Ernst B. Haas. See Ref. 4. Two authors, in applying the functional test to another NATO institution, assert that the functionalist believes that "the most desirable route to international community-building proceeds gradually from initial transitional cooperation in the solution of common problems." See Ref. 8.

II. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

THE TYPE OF ALLIANCE

No two alliances are organized alike. Structural comparisons, therefore, are apt to be fruitless unless they are concentrated on certain fundamental distinctions. The issue of "supranationality" towers above all other characteristics. Any study of how NATO functions must deal with NATO as a consultative, not a supranational organization, despite its supranational legal status.*

This point needs emphasis for Americans, for we tend to think in terms of a unitary system -- or a federation -- in which overriding authority, at least for specified functions, is assigned to the central government. NATO belongs to a different species -- a confederation, or something even less authoritative -- in which each component member retains the right not only to reject for itself the proposals of a central organization, but also to veto the acceptance of a common policy by others as well.

NATO has tried to surmount this built-in divisiveness, which would obviously have a disastrous effect on military efficiency, by an ingenious web of "command arrangements." These provisions take on a real bite in time of war when they call for passage of control to supranational agents. How well they would work in war can only be surmised; but that does not concern us here, for the training experience we will analyze has been accumulated in peacetime.

A lack of supranational authority handicaps international agents in a number of ways. First, obviously, it limits them to "advising" nations rather than "directing." This means that many proposals of the international command apparatus will not be implemented because some nations do not wish to comply. It also means that the international agents must negotiate from a weak international base.** Positions adopted by NATO commanders can be overturned by

* The view of NATO's role changed from nation to nation. To the United States, NATO appears as consultative; to West Germany, NATO appears to be supranational.

** United States senior officers in their NATO capacities, of

the higher councils of national representatives on the objection of one member.

Finally, since NATO institutions have no corporate existence (except for minor administrative functions) they possess no assets that can be used for bargaining with nations. In contrast, the Commission of the European Economic Community (at least theoretically) controls the allocation of common funds derived from agricultural levies collected by the member countries. The Commission, which functions for this purpose under a weighted majority rule, can presumably dispose of these funds in a manner that may displease some minority members. While the minority can -- and frequently does -- obstruct the implementation of programs it does not like, it cannot alter the decision. Thus, even when the Commission does not act against minority wishes, it has assets with which to bargain for compromise solutions. In practice, of course, the Commission is chary of any over-exercise of its corporate authority against an important member of the community.

NATO institutions lack even this limited power. All funds available to them are meted out parsimoniously by the nations. The international structure therefore has no resources with which to induce cooperation -- or even to use autonomously as it sees fit. The only inducement an international agent can use in negotiating with one nation is the prospect that he may be able to persuade other countries to take action that would be favorable to the nation in question.

To point to these weaknesses in the position of the international structure should imply no denigration of the role it has played. We are concerned here with analyzing the coordination that has been achieved, and it redounds to the credit of the international structure that its officials have been able to accomplish much under severe handicaps. Actually, coordinated action that has been

course, enjoyed strong bargaining positions that stemmed from their ability, real or presumed, to influence the amount or nature of U.S. contributions to NATO defense.

accomplished by indirect inducement or persuasion may be more lasting and effective than that imposed by edict. But the student who would understand alliances better should know more about the processes that have been used; in fact, one wonders why, two decades after the alliance was formed, so much uncertainty still exists about the powers, authority, and performance of the international structure.

THE "TERMS OF REFERENCE" OF INTERNATIONAL COMMANDERS

The duties and responsibilities of the NATO international hierarchy, as they apply to training, can be found in several documents; most citations relate to the two Supreme Commanders, SACEUR and SACLANT. This study will concentrate on SACEUR and SACLANT, with an occasional reference to their major subordinate commanders. Although other agencies deal with training, these two officials occupy positions at the focal points of the international-national relationships we wish to survey.

Article 13 of the final act of the London Conference of October 1954 reads in part as follows:

The North Atlantic Council . . . confirms that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime extend not only to the organization into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him, but also to their training; that in this field, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe *has direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime*; and that he should receive facilities from member nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied * Command Europe earmarked for that command [italics added].*

From this protocol it would appear that SACEUR has been delegated broad powers in the training of assigned forces. Yet we know also that each country retains a training responsibility for its own forces and that most countries have developed sizeable establishments devoted to that task. Even under conditions where ample benefits and little cost would be connected with coordinated training activities, it would seem that these overlapping responsibilities would cause

*See Ref. 9, p. 256.

friction between NATO and national authorities.

SACEUR's mission is clarified to an extent by other "terms of reference." The *NATO Handbook* asserts that SACEUR's role involves "training . . . forces assigned and earmarked to his command so as to insure that they are knitted together into one unified force."^{*} Under this concept the nations would presumably train their individuals and their combat units, handing them over to SACEUR, who would then teach the separate national contingents to work together. But even under this concept it is difficult to draw the line between training pure and simple and training designed to "knit" forces together.^{**}

Sometimes the two are inseparable. For example, an American fighter pilot flying from his base in Holland might be vectored by

* See Ref. 10, p. 30.

** This ambiguity bothers NATO experts as well as neophytes. Witness this exchange when the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the late John T. McNaughton, was appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, whose members are probably as knowledgeable as any Americans on the intricacies of NATO organization.

Mr. Frelinghuysen: Training is an international responsibility?

Mr. McNaughton: There is a division here. The training is a national responsibility but you do have an international responsibility to exercise the forces consistent with the plans. In other words we train our people. . . .

Mr. Frelinghuysen: I don't understand what you are saying. Do they train together or does each country train separately but in accordance with an internationally developed plan?

Mr. McNaughton: The word "training" I think is a broad one.

Mr. Frelinghuysen: Is it an exercise?

Mr. McNaughton: Exercise is a little bit different from training. An exercise is training obviously, but is an exercise of the NATO plans, which adds on to the training that the Americans would be responsible for giving to their own American forces.

Mrs. Kelly: I am thoroughly confused now.

The discussion then drifted away from training and no one attempted to clarify the points that caused Mrs. Kelly's real or feigned confusion. Hearings, *The Crisis in NATO*, Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 45.

a Dutch, French, Belgian, German, British, or Canadian ground controller. Chaos would result if these operators did not have a means of technical communication (compatible radio transmitters and receivers, designated frequencies, etc.), a standard means of verbal communication (language and terminology), and common techniques. Someone had to inventory and analyze the differences, select the common article to be used, and guide the orderly changeover. Obviously, to convert to a common system, some nations had to make changes that they did not wish to make. Fortunately, in this case, the need for standardization was so compelling that nations acceded to NATO guidance. In many other cases, however, where SACEUR's mandate seemed more legitimate but where the payoffs were less certain or the costs greater, nations have refused to cooperate.

The training functions delegated to SACLANT, the other Supreme Commander, have been defined more precisely; this may be because he has no forces "assigned" to him in peacetime. The fighting contingents that would be committed to SACLANT in time of war vary considerably; therefore, his peacetime training responsibilities are less comprehensive. He is charged primarily with "conducting combined exercises . . . [and] laying down training standards."^{*}

The training responsibilities of these two principal international servants obviously differ. SACEUR's are broad gauge and tend to lead to a maximum overlapping with national prerogatives. SACLANT's are more restricted but still offer an opportunity for conflict, particularly if he should interpret his function of laying down training standards too conscientiously.

The next three chapters will survey and analyze how these two agents have gone about their tasks in the training field and how they have fared. We are interested in the measure of success they achieved and the methods they used to get nations to cooperate. Concrete evidence may be hard to procure; many NATO activities are

^{*} See Ref. 9, p. 32.

shrouded in security and participants are often reluctant to discuss the subjects.

On the question of whether or not international programs of collaboration have succeeded -- or lived up to expectations -- we will rely on circumstantial evidence. It stands to reason that SACEUR and SACLANT will have expanded their activities in areas where the payoffs have been greatest for the effort expended or in areas where they have encountered an enthusiastic response from the nations. Conversely, they will have phased down or abandoned un-economical activities, or ones that have stirred up national antagonism. Thus, by charting the activity trends over fifteen years we may, in a crude way, measure success.

* The material for this survey was gathered in the summer of 1965 from interviews and by researching the NATO Information Service files in Paris. When the author came to the task of collating this material in late 1967 it did not seem worthwhile to bring all data up to date. Hence a 1965 cutoff date has been used except where noted. The author has, however, checked his principal conclusions against the developments since 1965 and finds them to be valid.

III. HIGHER TRAINING

EXERCISES AND MANEUVERS

As we have noted, the international NATO commanders have been assigned the task of conducting combined exercises and other training designed to knit the forces together. This is logical. Certainly, if forces of different nations are to cooperate in a variety of possible military conflicts, someone must prepare for these contingencies by ironing out the contradictions between the systems used by the separate members. And who is better placed to do this job than the international commander who would direct these units in time of war?

For this reason SACEUR was ceded "direct control" of higher training. We need not define the boundaries of this higher training: whether it is confined solely to army divisions or larger formations; whether SACEUR can require a unit smaller than a division to use procedures that have been standardized throughout NATO; or whether he can demand that units train themselves in certain ways during the periods when they are not under his direct training jurisdiction. Obviously, the North Atlantic Council members were uncertain themselves on a number of these points and they left them purposely obscure in hopes that the operators would be able to work out the details.

Americans know enough about the problems of developing common procedures and compatible techniques among the four services of our own country to appreciate some of the difficulties that have confronted SACEUR. In many cases tradition and habit alone stand in the way of changes toward a common system. In other cases, alterations that would be simple in themselves would have an impact on organization or practices that could not be accommodated without great expense. In most cases, however, it has been found that the changes necessary in one service or one country, or in several services or countries, are so time-consuming or so costly that there is usually a question as to whether the benefits would be worth the effort.

This is particularly true in Europe. Only a portion of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force are assigned there, and the techniques

and equipment they use have been developed for worldwide applicability. Consequently, the United States, which favors integration, often finds itself less able than other nations to accommodate SACEUR on changes SACEUR would like to make for the sake of NATO uniformity.

Conditions vary throughout the 14 nations to such an extent that any operational unit tailored to local conditions will exist in numerous sizes, shapes, and compositions. There is, for example, no standard NATO division, although SACEUR has tried for a number of years to get the nations to agree on one or two configurations. If operational units, equipment, language, and national defense tasks differ, it follows that nomenclature, techniques, and tactics will also vary. Yet SACEUR must be sure that when he orders a squadron attack, he knows precisely how many aircraft will be dispatched. Or, when one of SACLANT's task force leaders signals for a major change of course in a flotilla, he must be confident that all ships will turn at a prearranged rate. Given the great number of equipment or unit characteristics that cannot be changed, one can see the complexity of the task facing SACEUR and SACLANT in drafting doctrine and standing operating procedures that can be uniformly applicable in spite of disparities in the forces.

NATO commanders have used maneuvers and exercises as the main instruments to weld the component parts into a harmonious entity. Exercises have turned out to be ideal for this purpose for several reasons. First, they reveal differences in operational techniques among national components. A closely related benefit is the exposure of shortcomings in composite plans, at least to the extent that exercises are realistic, and do not assume too many problems out of the way. (Obviously, assumptions are necessary to enable any exercise to proceed, and some types of error in planning may only come to light under conditions of actual conflict.) Maneuvers and exercises are also useful in convincing national officials, who are normally reluctant to change, that some alterations are necessary in the interests of effectiveness. Exercises offer the international and country authorities an opportunity to make improvements in their tactics and techniques and to watch the progress as units become

accustomed to operating with each other under common doctrine. Finally, exercises and maneuvers give the international commander a limited opportunity to introduce innovations which might not be agreed to in advance by the national authorities. He can do this because, during the limited period that the maneuver is actually in progress, he is assigned temporary command prerogatives paralleling those he would wield in war.

NATO authorities quickly recognized the advantages of maneuvers; before the organization had been in existence for three years it was monitoring approximately 100 exercises annually.* That number has now more than doubled, and the exercises themselves have become far more comprehensive. Of course, numbers can be misleading, for many of these are national maneuvers in which NATO officials act only as observers. A high percentage are also Command Post Exercises (CPX's) designed to test communications and staff procedures without the participation of combat units. The remainder, about one-quarter, are planned and directed by the international headquarters and involve troops.

Maneuvers bring drawbacks as well as benefits, and understandably, countries are not always enthusiastic about participating. Often the planning for them must be more meticulous than it would be for actual combat operations. Safety precautions are critical and they must be woven in skillfully or they will destroy the realism.

Exercises sometimes stir up public controversies that military and political leaders would prefer to avoid. Exercise Carte Blanche, the major SHAPE maneuver of 1955, generated widespread discussion when it was disclosed that the allies had simulated the use of several hundred tactical atomic weapons with an estimated loss of more than half a million lives in West Germany.** Exercise Big Lift, run in 1963, caused uneasiness in Germany because of the fear that the United States, having demonstrated the ability to airlift 15,000

* See Ref. 11, p. 104.

** The impact of this revelation on the discussions then taking place in the *Bundestag* regarding rearmament is evaluated in Ref. 12, pp. 182 to 193.

troops from America to Europe in a few days, might use this as an excuse to withdraw some of the permanently deployed troops.

Probably the most onerous thing about maneuvers, however, is their cost. An international exercise almost by definition requires that national components be brought together from scattered areas, and transportation alone can be expensive. In most of Western Europe, large training areas are scarce, which compels troops to maneuver over farm and pasture land; this means expenses for rental and damage payments. POL, supplies, and spare parts are always consumed at abnormally high rates during exercises. Commercial air and sea traffic often has to be rerouted. The rental of special teletype and telephone lines generates large communications bills. Even the preparation of reports and critiques can run to large sums. **

Thus, cost considerations exert a controlling influence and nations have been known to refuse to approve or to force curtailment of NATO proposals that they believe to be too extravagant. Nations also refuse to approve on other grounds besides cost, we are told. For example, political animosities have frequently caused alteration or cancellation of plans for Greek and Turkish units in the Eastern Mediterranean when periodic flareups of the Cyprus situation have created tension. *** On one occasion, Norway refused to allow its reserve forces to take part in an all-NATO exercise because this would have meant the citizens would have been absent during a national election. Sometimes nations have other uses for the forces that would be involved in maneuvers; hence, they refuse to commit their units or pull them out prematurely. In SACLANT's major 1964 exercise, France withdrew the majority of her naval units shortly before the

* *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, The Hague, June-July 1964.

** In one case, it was noted, 800 officers attended a SACLANT critique. *NATO Letter*, Paris, France, January 1958.

*** To permit the conduct of Greek-Turkish maneuvers, the NATO solution at one point was two separate activities, with NATO staff hopping back and forth by helicopter.

maneuver began. Britain and the United States pulled out some units during the exercise, diverting them to other tasks.*

Nations have also disputed the strategic concepts that have been woven into the maneuvers. This was given as the reason France refused to participate in the biannual all-NATO FALLEX-64. The French complained that the strategy on which the exercise was based did not conform with the official NATO doctrine.**

On the whole, however, nations have responded vigorously to the calls of the international directorate for participation in combined exercises. NATO public relations sections are probably more willing to discuss and explain maneuvers and exercises than any other function of the international structure. Every issue of the *NATO Letter* contains reports on exercises conducted during the previous month. SACLANT, of course, tends to emphasize antisubmarine warfare and naval maneuvers. SACEUR accents air defense and air strike plans.

SACEUR has also conducted a series of maneuvers to test a unique international body known as the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF). This task group, established in 1961, is made up of battalions contributed by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.*** A small permanent international headquarters (approximately 30 officers and men), located at Seckenheim, Germany, plans and directs maneuvers. The combat battalions themselves remain with their national armies until called to service.

SACEUR has tested the mobility of this force every year since it was organized. The size of the exercise has grown from about 250 men in 1961 to more than 4000 in the latest maneuvers. The AMF illustrates the problems of combined operations that are encountered when the international authorities attempt to amalgamate units

* *Yorkshire Evening Post*, Yorkshire, England, September 24, 1965.

** *The New York Herald Tribune*, May 31, 1965.

*** Later plans incorporated an air element of three squadrons. Depending on the area to be reinforced, the squadrons would be supplied by three of the following countries: Belgium, The Netherlands,

smaller than self-contained army divisions. The AMF has found it necessary to publish its own SOPs concerning almost every phase of administrative and operational activity. National habits are so diverse in such matters as morning reports, intelligence summaries, operations orders, supply requisitions, and mission reports that a composite force made up of battalion-size components simply cannot function without establishing its own set of regulations. In the case of the AMF it was necessary for the commander to hold a special conference to iron out differences in artillery and mortar procedures before units could safely be allowed to furnish fire support for each other.*

NATO authorities have encountered difficulties with the AMF which are directly attributable to the divided authority that exists in the training field. While nations are willing to earmark troops for the force, they consider this only a secondary assignment. National missions and training programs take priority. Many observers on the flank areas of NATO, where the AMF is designed to be used, wonder if the battalions would ever be released by their governments in a real-life crisis.

The degree to which SACEUR is dependent on nations for airlift to carry the AMF to maneuver sites illustrates the point made in Section II about the lack of inducements available to international agents. Many believe SACEUR should have a fund for training purposes which could be accumulated and disbursed independently of the nations. Lacking this, he should be able to procure some common necessities, such as airlift for the AMF, from funds placed at his disposal by the nations as a group. (The United States and most other members favor common funding for all AMF activities.)

Actually, neither system is used. Although SACEUR has pleaded for international financing, he still must go from one to another

West Germany, Britain, and the United States. Fred S. Hoffman, "NATO's Mobile Forces," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1966, p. 242.

*"Allied Mobile Force," *ARMY*, August 1966.

of the larger nations who own air transport asking for donations.* Since SACEUR has no funds to purchase this service, and since he has sometimes failed to persuade nations to volunteer it, prospective AMF exercises have occasionally been cancelled or curtailed for lack of air transport.

The refusal of nations to make available a fund to SACEUR for airlifting the AMF is typical of the tight control that the allies exercise over international authorities in financial matters. Much as they seem to favor international directorship of exercises and maneuvers, they still hold a firm rein over the expenditure of funds.

The AMF experience illustrates the jurisdictional problem as well. The international commander of the AMF controls the training program of his units *only* when they are on the brief annual maneuvers; at other times, he can "advise" the national authorities, but he has no assurance that they will comply. This arrangement falls far short of the aspirations of the NATO commanders. It is said that General Sir Richard Gale, erstwhile Deputy SACEUR, who originated the AMF idea, visualized a force that would spend the greater part of the year living and training together. His ideas were found to be "too ambitious, as members would not release the men nor finance the force."**

STANDARDIZATION OF PROCEDURES

One of the principal aims in teaching large units from different countries to operate effectively together is to persuade them to use common procedures. This the NATO authorities have attempted to do in several ways other than through exercises and maneuvers. A prime leader in this field has been the Military Agency for

* John S. Hadder, "NATO's Mobile Force in Action," *NATO Letter*, September 1964. Another author suggests that, with France's withdrawal from the decisionmaking bodies, the allies will be able to agree on common funding for AMF activities. Fred S. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 247.

** *The Guardian*, Manchester, England, August 8, 1964.

Standardization (MAS), located in London, whose directive includes a mission to "study and foster a standardization throughout the armed forces of member countries of operational and administrative practice. . . ." * The MAS is organized into boards, one for each of the three services, with working groups of experts for specific topics providing the representation from the interested governments. ** Multilateral agreements are published in a form known as a Standardization Agreement (STANAG) -- of which there are now more than 650 approved and about 200 still being processed. ***

The MAS has sponsored a series of documents known as Allied Tactical Publications, which prescribe the procedures to be used when forces of different countries operate together. Neither the Allied Tactical Publications nor the STANAGs have to be approved unanimously. They can be placed in effect when a number of nations, by accepting the MAS proposal, commit themselves to use a common practice.

Opinions differ regarding the effectiveness of the MAS. Many field officers give it short shrift. But a thorough analysis would come to a more favorable judgment. For one thing, even when the MAS cannot secure agreement by all parties to operate in a common manner it is able to publish documents to tell one nation about the techniques followed by others. One extremely useful publication is the *NATO Glossary of Terms* which establishes common terminology and allows members with different languages to communicate in common terms.

For another thing, troops in the field often benefit from standard procedure without knowing it. Most NATO maps and charts

* MAS-NATO Military Standardization Briefing, Unclassified, Longdon, April 1964.

** The organization and operation of the MAS is explained in an article by Lieutenant Colonel John W. Moses, "NATO Standardization in Action," *Army Information Digest*, October 1964, pp. 41-46.

*** Report of the U.S. House of Representatives Delegation to the Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., October 4-9, 1965.

conform to specifications worked out by the MAS and use scales and symbols standardized by it. Often the MAS is successful in persuading nations to use standard techniques, but the national manuals and handbooks do not bear any notice that the procedures have been agreed to by others.

NATO officials point with pride to the standardization of nomenclature and procedures in the field of air transport. Because of the activities of the MAS, as improved by frequent practice, air transport aircraft from one nation can move troops and equipment from another as easily as it can transport troops of its own nationality. On the other hand, we must not overestimate the success of standardization. For, as we have seen in the AMF experience, battalion-size units from different countries encounter great difficulty in operating in close conjunction with each other because of the variances in their procedures and techniques.

Finally, NATO institutions have sponsored the exchange of information between countries. The international liaison effort has taken the form of multilateral seminars, conferences, and symposiums. Judging by coverage in the official NATO literature (primarily the *NATO Letter*), activities in this field have been steadily declining since the early days of the alliance. In the beginning the central institutions conducted a wide variety of such meetings.* The standardization introduced by SACEUR in the meteorology field seems to have paved the way for common methods of weather reporting throughout Europe, civilian as well as military.

Logistical standardization holds an obvious importance for countries who would combine their efforts in wartime. NATO literature tells us of progress in standardizing techniques, procedures, and terminology for shipping, surface transportation, field distribution, and marking. In the medical field we are told of increasing uniformity for such items as vaccination, evacuation by air, and

* *NATO Letter*, September 1956, tells of a 13-nation conference of naval chaplains held in The Netherlands to which "Turkey sent a Moslem observer."

labels for pharmaceutical products.*

A coordinating organization like NATO probably depends more on communications than any other single item. Yet the majority of communications facilities used by the international commanders are owned by the separate nations that make up the alliance -- and in many cases these facilities are operated by nonmilitary agencies. Equipment, language, and procedures vary widely throughout Europe. NATO commanders, concerned with speed, reliability, and wartime security of transmissions are engaged in a continuous process of attempting to persuade nations to change entrenched practices in order to standardize or to improve service. For a good cause, then, each Supreme Commander holds an annual meeting of the Chief Signal Officers from each nation. It has been noted that these are the only formal opportunities for national signal authorities to meet en masse with each other. The Seventh Annual meeting at SHAPE, which lasted for eight days in March 1959, was attended by 96 military and civilian representatives from the continental countries.**

RÉSUMÉ

NATO authorities have achieved their greatest success in monitoring higher training. No matter how a future war in Europe might develop, it can be said that the allied armies, navies, and air forces will never have to take the field under the confusing conditions, and with the lack of knowledge about their partners, that marked the opening phases of World Wars I and II.

The nations have responded readily to suggestions and have allowed the international commanders to direct activities as they saw fit except when fundamental issues of finance or strategy were involved. There is no evidence, however, that nations have acted against their own interests. Rather, it would seem that they have valued so highly the ability to act effectively in large-scale

*NATO's Fifteen Nations, February-March 1962, p. 56.

**NATO Letter, April 1959.

activities with neighbors that they were willing to pay the substantial costs involved in conducting this sort of training. There is also evidence that nations have cut down on their unilateral exercise programs in order to have their units participate in larger, combined maneuvers. This is particularly true with regard to air forces, where the most realistic training for air defense units can be derived from working with neighboring allies who can better simulate external attackers.

Judging from the decreasing volume of coverage in NATO literature, the international apparatus has phased down its efforts to coordinate national activities through seminars and conferences. This has probably resulted from the fact that most standardization that can be done with little effort has already taken place, though many areas of potential standardization still exist.

IV. UNIT TRAINING

COMMUNITY INSTALLATIONS AND CROSS-BORDER COLLABORATION

As we have noted, international jurisdiction over unit training is far less extensive and certain than it is for higher training. (A "unit" may be any body of men to be trained as a team for the purpose of, say, firing a missile or operating a destroyer.) While NATO is not assigned the responsibility for prescribing how units should function, at the same time there would be obvious advantages to the operating efficiency of the combined force if all units used the same procedures and were trained in the same manner.

NATO has suffered several rebuffs in its efforts to establish community programs for unit training. Lord Ismay, writing in 1954, mentioned four air bases in the Mediterranean to be constructed from alliance funds to serve as sites for combined training. He spoke also of projects to establish and equip several maneuver grounds for army troops in Central Europe.*

From these aspirations only one army training ground, Bergen-Hohne in Germany, has materialized as a full-blown combined activity. Some countries maintain their own national training grounds, which they allow others to use, but the owners have been noticeably reticent to put them under NATO auspices, even when that meant that the alliance would pay for the facilities needed.

No one in the NATO system wishes to comment on Lord Ismay's remarks about the four air bases.** No air bases today, however, are operated as combined training establishments under NATO auspices. One base, Decimomannu, Sardinia, is used as a bombing and gunnery range by the Italian, German, and Canadian air forces. This is an

* See Ref. 11, p. 124.

** International headquarters has almost no "memory." It is certainly worse than national staffs in this regard. Tours of service are short (mostly two years), files are scanty, and few officers return for second assignments. As a consequence, continuity lags and there is very little recollection of what went on five or ten years before.

instance of utilitarian cooperation, for Canada and Germany have money but lack flying space and good weather bases in Europe, whereas Italy has fine weather, plenty of bases, and needs money.

Lord Ismay probably also had reference to Solenzara, Corsica, which was planned to be an advanced training school for the F-100, an aircraft to which a half dozen countries were then converting. Although the base was constructed from infrastructure funds, the training project never materialized because of disputes among the would-be participants over the distribution of costs of training equipment, instructors, and additional facilities.

The inability of the NATO structure to persuade nations to collaborate on air training bases in the Mediterranean must be chalked up as a failure to meet expectations whether or not one agrees that NATO should be in this kind of business. Apparently the NATO authorities thought a combined activity would be worthwhile. Certain economies of scale would apply. The central and northern air forces needed warm-weather training bases. Belgium and France have lost the extensive training installations they once owned in the Congo, Algeria, and Morocco. Training of pilots in the densely-populated, bad-weather areas of Central Europe is far more dangerous, expensive, and time-consuming than it would be in the Mediterranean. The United States can still use Spain, even after evacuating bases in Morocco and Libya; the Germans have partially alleviated their situation by constructing a \$50 million training base at Beja, Portugal; but the smaller countries still lack a solution to their problem.*

The most ambitious joint training project that NATO has tried to assemble, the NAMFI missile range, has begun operations after a prolonged construction period. Ever since NATO nations began to equip their forces with modern missiles in the late 1950s they have needed a firing range in Europe. Missile crews ought occasionally to fire a real warhead, but this is impossible in the congested areas of Western Europe. Heretofore, most Nike teams, more than 30 in all, have each year taken the long trek to the United States to practice live firing in Texas.

*The Washington Post, August 23, 1965.

NATO military authorities drew up plans for a common missile range, and a number of sites were investigated before it was decided to locate the range on the island of Crete. In mid-1964 the Infrastructure Committee released the specifications for international competitive bidding. The construction was paid for by all NATO nations, since the money was taken from the common infrastructure fund. However, disputes between countries over the awarding of contracts dogged the project. The official opening was delayed more than two years beyond the originally estimated date.

The NAMFI range is something of an innovation in common procedures. Although the base construction was financed from infrastructure sources, the maintenance and operation is prorated among the eight countries who use it. This arrangement may be a pioneering step in the process of inducing small groups of nations to collaborate in projects where some are more interested than others. There would seem to be numerous occasions in which joint enterprises of this type could reduce unit cost and make the training activities of a number of nations more efficient. It remains to be seen how much of a breakthrough in procedures the NAMFI range represents - certainly the halting pace of construction has not gotten it off to an auspicious start. From the point of view of our theoretical discussions, the NAMFI experience suggests that national self-interest is not confined to the end product: training. Even though all participants stood to benefit somewhat from spreading the overhead costs among several nations, a few countries, the United States included, insisted that they also profit from what they considered to be their equitable share of the production melon.

Furthermore, the competition between allies was not confined to construction contracts. Several countries fought to have the range located on their soil, because of the stimulus to the local economy. The leading contenders to host this range were the Mediterranean partners, Greece, Turkey, and Italy. Early lists of prospective participants included Turkey and Italy, both of whom have missile units that need to fire on some range.* Apparently, when Crete

*NATO Information Service, *NATO Bibliography*, Paris, 1962, p. 142.

was selected as the site, Turkey and Italy lost interest and dropped out.

So much for attempts at consolidation. The international organization has also served to stimulate and coordinate mutual assistance among the partners. Canadian and American Military Assistance Programs of the 1950s dominate the scene. They probably resulted in more standardization than all other efforts combined.

The Military Assistance Programs were implemented as bilateral arrangements between donor and recipient countries. Final transactions had to be consummated in that manner because they involved legal contracts that had to be entered into between sovereign states. But NATO officials played an important, if indirect, role in both the American and Canadian programs.

Canada has always offered its equipment and services to NATO for distribution, and in most cases, has accepted the international officials' recommended allocation to countries.* In the opening days of the alliance, the U.S. Congress also insisted that American military aid, including new equipment and training, be allocated to countries on the basis of a master NATO strategic development plan. Almost every Congressional MAP presentation contains the statement that "this training will be in harmony with the priorities established by the NATO military authorities. . . ."** Not only has NATO provided continuity and priority direction to the buildup in Europe, but international agents have also been influential in persuading both European and American leadership of the necessity for these programs.

Incidentally, this support works both ways. SACEUR has been of great assistance to national defense authorities in helping them justify expenditures to those who control the purse strings. In turn, the ability to influence the kind and amount of U.S. and Canadian

* *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, January 1960, p. 91.

** Presentation of Col. H. H. Critz, *Mutual Security Act of 1957*, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 976A.

aid that would flow to each European country enhanced SACEUR's power and prestige with the recipients. With the elimination of MAP for all nations except Greece and Turkey, SACEUR has lost a valuable source of influence. He can no longer use his indirect control of the MAP pipeline as a bargaining point to induce nations to follow a collective policy.

One must inquire why no combined schools were set up in Europe at the height of the MAP conversion program which peaked in the later 1950s. At that time the United States was donating or assisting in the purchase of many sophisticated new weapons like the Nike, Corporal, Sergeant, Matador, Honest John, Hawk, Pershing, and Jupiter. These were not modifications of former weapons; being different from anything in the inventory, they required extensive training programs for maintenance personnel and operators. Offhand, it would seem far simpler and less expensive to have established in Europe a common training school for these new weapons with facilities built and paid for out of infrastructure funds.

Apparently such a scheme was never seriously considered. For one thing, Americans had ample training mock-ups and ranges available in the United States and, since the recipient governments generally paid the transportation expenses for trainees, it cost the United States little more to train these personnel in America than it would have in Europe. Furthermore, at a U.S.-operated school Americans could demand high standards of proficiency from the trainees and could carry out their program unhampered by international supervision. European governments probably preferred an American school because it cost them less to transport their personnel to and from the Western Hemisphere than it would have cost them in contributions to the NATO common funds needed to build and operate the facilities in Europe. Even when countries such as Germany paid for their instructions (as well as transportation) in the United States, they probably rated this as a bargain.*

* In 1966, it was announced that the German Air Force would move its entire surface-to-air missile school from Aachen to Fort Bliss,

These were sizeable programs. A news report tells us that at one time 500 Italian trainees were receiving instruction on the Jupiter missile at Huntsville, Alabama. As we know, only two countries participated in the Jupiter deployment, but approximately 18 Nike battalions were manned and operated by NATO allies in addition to more than a dozen U.S. units deployed in Germany. A Nike training cadre consists of about 250 personnel, and the cost of initial training per package runs to approximately half a million dollars.

In FY 1958 the NATO training allocation came to only \$11.5 million out of a worldwide total of \$74 million. However, since most of the NATO countries at that time had begun to pay for their training, whereas the under-developed countries of the rest of the world did not, these figures leave an erroneous impression. When the "bought" training is added to the "free," European countries accounted for more than half of the foreign national training in America, and the bill was more than \$40 million. By fiscal year 1963, the U.S. worldwide training grant had increased to \$109 million.*

The NATO role in the development of these programs has varied. Several news releases explicitly state that certain training is a result of collaboration between *NATO headquarters*, the United States, and the recipient government.** We also know that SACEUR was influential in setting the priorities for equipping various nations with new missiles and, concomitantly, for scheduling their training. But whether NATO officials were desirous of establishing a combined school, or whether they ever tried to get this done, is not clear. Certainly there was no prodding from the recipient countries who appeared to prefer the bilateral arrangements with the United States.

NATO authorities have played a valuable role in arranging for one country to use training areas in another. Germany maintains the

Texas. A permanent staff of 280 German instructors would train about 1200 students a year. *Military Review*, February 1966, p. 197.

* Hearings, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess., p. 62.

** See *NATO Letter*, October 1959.

largest army and air force in Western Europe; yet, because of legal proscriptions and high density population, the FRG has been the least able to acquire training sites at home. German forces were not welcomed with open arms in many regions of Europe even 15 years after the war. NATO served not only to find available sites but also to explain the need and legitimize the appearance of German troops in adjacent lands.

Some quarters in Britain and France were incensed early in 1960 when word leaked out that Germany was negotiating for bases in Spain. The executive committee of the Labour Party passed a resolution of opposition. German Defense Minister Strauss quickly grabbed the NATO mantle and asserted that it was an international responsibility, not his, to find German training bases outside of Germany.* "If NATO obtains such facilities in Greece," he said, "we would of course, reconsider our position [on the Spanish bases]."^{**}

In the intervening years Germany, implicitly or explicitly through NATO, has worked out arrangements with almost every European ally. By 1965 more than 10,000 German troops were being trained each year in England and France. We have already mentioned German use of the BETA air base in Portugal, which was negotiated bilaterally between West Germany and Portugal.

While German troops most of all needed NATO's blessing to be accepted in other countries -- and this authentication was used for German training expeditions to Denmark, Belgium, and Italy *** -- other countries also felt the need to call for NATO sanctification occasionally. The British had to placate their own public by having NATO justify an infantry brigade deployed to Portugal in 1961 (the

* *The Times*, London, March 8, 1960.

** *The Sunday Times*, London, March 13, 1960.

*** Communist newspapers in Italy scored a coup just before the important elections of 1960 when an unwary NATO spokesman at Naples denied his headquarters had anything to do with the German maneuver in Sardinia -- a maneuver that Italian defense officials had earlier justified on the basis that it was a routine "NATO exercise." *Combat*, October 24, 1960.

deployment took place, inopportunely, just as a crisis erupted in Angola). Again in 1962, when they invited French paratroopers to train in Britain, the Conservative government attributed the decision to NATO policy.

One should also not overlook a valuable service that NATO has provided through its personnel agreements. In pre-NATO times, special arrangements were necessary between countries -- and often for each visit -- to cover the legal rights and obligations of troops on foreign soil. Now such matters are routinely handled under the omnibus NATO Status of Forces agreement.

NATO AS A STANDARDIZER

"Laying down training standards" has been specified as one of the two primary functions of SACLANT, and by inference, of SACEUR as well. NATO officials do not freely talk about this topic, probably because it leads inevitably to discussions about how nations are meeting the standards. Any international evaluation, formal or informal, raises extremely sensitive issues and NATO officials steer clear of them whenever possible. A few years ago German opinion was inflamed by the publication of a rumor that FRG troops had been adjudged deficient by NATO authorities in the maneuvers of 1962. In the resulting furor, German Defense Minister Strauss had members of the editorial staff of *Der Spiegel* arrested on suspicion of treason for circulating a report that would have attracted little notice had it originated in German circles.*

For this reason, though there may be others as well, NATO documents setting forth standards for national units and those evaluating national performance are classified. We do know that SACEUR publishes a manual outlining the types of training to be conducted by each category of combat unit assigned to him. If it is like most other NATO training literature, it will resemble the directives issued

* For an English translation of the *Der Spiegel* article see *Survival*, January-February 1963; for a report of the arrest see *The New York Times*, October 28, 1962. Those arrested included the

by the national authorities themselves except that it will be couched in more flexible terms and will set requirements near the less strenuous end of the spectrum. This is understandable. SACEUR would certainly not demand the same weather and night flying practice from Italian crews as he would from the Norwegians. His only alternatives are to discriminate or deal in easily attainable minimums.*

We also know that the Supreme Commanders make annual evaluations of the effectiveness of assigned forces. ** Just how much emphasis is placed on training is hard to determine; for air force units, the raters evidently use such indicators as the number of hours flown by each crew. *** Very little public information is available, however, to tell us how the overall evaluations are made; in many cases, apparently, assessments are drawn up after an analysis of the statistical data submitted by the nations themselves. The deficiencies of this method of self-evaluation are obvious.

At other times, however, NATO authorities take an active part in judging the status of assigned forces, as evidenced by this remark of a senior officer in Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central

present Deputy Speaker of the Grand Coalition government, Conrad Ahlers, who is now apparently once again on good terms with Mr. Strauss.

* Even this can precipitate politically sensitive issues. *Time* magazine, July 29, 1966, p. 23, noted that, whereas NATO recommended 20 hours per month proficiency flying for each F-104 pilot, German Air Force crewmen were getting, on the average, only 13 hours. In view of the high F-104 accident rate, German defense officials undoubtedly received additional censure from spokesmen of the political opposition for failing to provide the bare essentials stipulated by such a lenient taskmaster as SACEUR.

** Testimony of General Robert Wood, Director of MAP, Hearing, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1965*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 1st sess., p. 737.

*** NATO officers made a careful distinction here. They go to some lengths to explain that they do not "inspect" a national force. Instead they "evaluate" its ability to perform its wartime mission. One gains the impression that the distinction is emphasized because of national sensitivities. Units are rated for readiness, alert procedures, reaction time, logistics, and ability to survive.

Europe (AAFCE):

In the field of training it is of course imperative the CINCENT should be able to satisfy himself that the training and operational readiness of his forces are up to the required standards for war purposes. To this end, the national forces cooperate to the full in their participation in exercises when requested by CINCENT and in meeting SHAPE criteria in service-ability and operational readiness state. In addition, the nations permit access to their units by international staffs from the various NATO headquarters for the purpose of examination and training evaluation.

Actually, it is generally acknowledged that nations frequently do not meet the criteria set by SHAPE for combat-ready forces. Although the prime deficiencies result from obsolete, inoperable, or missing equipment, a number of inadequacies are known to exist in the realm of manning and training. Some shortfalls are gradually being eliminated with the acquisition of training ground and ranges. Most remedies, however, depend on national action, and the NATO commanders can only act as a nagging conscience.

As a second aspect of its task as a standardizer, NATO tries to induce nations to use common procedures. As noted in the previous chapter, NATO commanders can direct that a specified procedure be used between major units while under NATO control during maneuvers, but international authorities have difficulty prescribing procedures to be used internally when internal activities do not affect other units. What business is it of the NATO authorities, nations have been known to ask, if a Nike missile team in one country uses five men to perform a function performed by eight persons in another country?

Much standardization of internal doctrine is done voluntarily by the nations; the MAS codifies and formalizes wherever possible. Some standardization has been achieved mechanically as complex new American weapons were introduced, because U.S. training and operational literature has left a common imprint.

* Air Commodore S. B. Grant, *Royal Air Forces Quarterly*, Winter, 1964.

There remains still a wide area where common practice is lacking and NATO authorities have worked patiently and skillfully to piece together acceptable compromises. They have encountered notable success in the field of competitive testing. Not only does inter-allied competition force units to employ NATO-approved techniques or be graded down, but it also improves unit quality and fosters alliance esprit de corps.

Since air forces are particularly amenable to comparison and evaluation, AAFCE developed a series of competitions to keep its units up to the minute in reconnaissance, air-to-air gunnery, bombing, navigation, rocketry, and strafing.* The Royal Flush reconnaissance competition, inaugurated in 1955, set the pattern for other annual contests. Royal Flush has resulted in "higher and higher NATO standards of operational performance . . . and led to improved year-long training programs throughout all assigned recce units."**

These programs accomplish far more than sharpening the skills of a few top-notch crews. Competing teams are judged on the way they perform using the standardized techniques. Hence, national authorities in preparing teams to represent them must teach NATO procedures. A useful innovation, designed to widen the use of common doctrine and to extend international evaluation deep into each national force, was introduced in 1962 at the Tactical Weapons meet. Instead of allowing each nation to nominate its standard-bearers, the judges selected crews by random choice from all fighter-bomber crews in the command that had been declared "combat-ready." This system put pressure on nations to train all crews under NATO specifications before certifying them as combat-ready.

In many cases, European army organizations have been equipped with missiles that, like air force weapons, lend themselves to direct comparison. European Nike missile teams compete each year for the

* AAFCE was in 1966 incorporated into Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCE).

** *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, October-November 1962.

Dirk U. Stikker trophy.* In referring to this live-firing contest, first held in 1961, an observer notes:

The yearly tests at McGregor Range [Fort Bliss] were . . . so planned that, in addition to testing and practicing live Nike missile firing capabilities, they would also reveal any deviations from the standard operating procedures [italics added].**

As a result of these and other NATO command network efforts at standardization for the Nike missiles, it can now be said, for example, that the term "guns free" means exactly the same thing in Norway as it does in Turkey -- and that is no small accomplishment.

NATO navies probably enjoy a greater degree of standardized doctrine than either of the other services. Strange craft can join up and coordinate their activities almost completely by use of the Allied Tactical Publications. In 1965, four destroyers -- one each from The Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada -- sailed together for five months and engaged in a variety of training chores.*** They also learned that NATO common practices extend to a number of logistical areas and that, with a liberal dose of improvisation, ships of one nation could be supported in the main by foreign tankers and supply depots.

* If a dramatic example of nonconformity were needed, one could cite the assignment of Nikes to the armed services. The United States, which developed and manufactured the weapons, placed them with the U.S. Army, while many European nations have integrated Nikes into the air defense establishments operated by their Air Forces.

** *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, October-November 1962.

*** Jack Kestner, "Operation Matchmaker, a NATO Team Success," *NAVY*, September 1965, p. 27.

V. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Individual instruction makes up the bulk of the training load for all NATO countries. Every member of the armed services, officer or "other rank," conscript or career bent, requires some generalized (and usually some specialized) training before being qualified to perform his military function.

As with unit training, so also in the field of individual instruction, the major collective endeavors have grown out of the Canadian and U.S. Military Assistance Programs. (We consider MAP -- and flying training, too -- under both unit and individual categories because the training comprises both types of instruction.) The contributions of Canada in the field of pilot, navigator, and bombardier training deserve special mention. From 1950 through 1958 more than 5000 persons were graduated from the Canadian training complex at a cost to Canada of some half a billion dollars.* While NATO officials had no direct role in administering this program, we do know that at the request of SACEUR the schedule was extended beyond the original 1958 terminal date.**

Both Canada and the United States are still training European pilots under a number of bilateral programs. Although these are essentially holdovers from the earlier MAP, most training is now paid for by the European recipient. The Germans, for example, prefer Western Hemisphere training because they believe it can be completed in half the time that would be required in Germany and at a substantially lower cost.***

NATO has played an ambiguous role in the training of individuals;

* For details of the Canadian training contributions, see *NATO Letter*, August 1958; *The Royal Air Force Quarterly*, Summer 1954; *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, January 1960, pp. 43 and 90; Ref. 11, p. 136; and *NATO Bibliography*, *passim*.

** *NATO Letter*, August 1958.

*** *NATO Journal*, February 1963, p. 26.

the central structure has acted more as an "honest broker" than as a supervisor. NATO authorities have refrained from specifying training objectives or acting assertively to produce standardization. There are good reasons for this. Canada, the United States, and other large powers maintain their own training establishment, each with its accustomed way of doing things, which generally differs from the way others do them. What international expert would be better able to establish training criteria than the national specialist who has been involved in training for years? Training, particularly pilot training, is considered an art by its practitioners and discussions about the best way to do it arouse typical artistic sensitivities. British and American pilot training techniques differ significantly.* One can imagine the friction that could arise if an Englishman assigned to NATO headquarters attempted to impose a change in instructional methods used in an American school where pilots from a third country were undergoing training.

This is not to argue that NATO officials should eschew attempts to persuade countries to adopt standard methods. Throughout the years patient effort has paid off in some instances. NATO officials have always been willing to serve as go-betweens whenever two or more nations wished to get together in any form of collectivization. NATO officials helped to bring about the arrangement whereby the basic training for both the Dutch and Belgian air forces is conducted exclusively by the Belgians and the advanced tactical instruction for the two air forces is carried out by the Dutch.^{**}

NATO officials were also instrumental in assisting the United States to set up a school in Deelen, Holland, to train operators and maintenance men on the ground installations for TACAN, a short-range tactical navigational system. Several hundred students from five nations were trained at this school during a three-year period starting in 1957. The equipment was furnished by the United States;

* See, for example, Wing Commander D. C. Saunders, "RAF Mission to the German Air Force," *The Royal Air Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1960.

** *The Royal Air Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1961, p. 101. This collaboration would be jeopardized if the Belgians follow their

Dutch instructors were trained in the Western Hemisphere under MAP. *

NATO officials also "prescribe and monitor" the course of instruction given at the U.S. Army Nuclear Weapons Course in Oberammergau, Germany. ** The school has turned out more than 12,000 graduates from its one- and two-week courses. Instruction is provided free by the United States, but each nation or NATO command that sends a student must pay his transportation, food, and housing costs.

It is difficult to determine just how active the NATO apparatus has been in arranging for exchange courses between countries because no records are kept after the initial contacts have been set up. In only a few cases, such as the schools at Oberammergau and Old Sarum, England, does the international organization distribute quotas. In other cases the international organization merely arranges the initial contacts between national authorities. A random sampling of the Western European press indicates that there is a wide variety of such exchange programs being conducted. Here are some examples from the *Stars and Stripes*:

Students from 20 assorted NATO countries train in winter operations at the Norwegian Army School (February 8, 1958); 34 Germans get maintenance training on aircraft at the RAF station at Jever, Germany (October 8, 1957); two all-German classes of 15 men each are graduated from the U.S. 7th Army Tank Training Center at Vilseck, Germany (September 26, 1957); 50 officers from assorted NATO countries attend 5-day USAFE Air-Ground Operations School (August 10, 1963); approximately 125 non-British NATO officers go through the British School of Land/Warfare each year (April 4, 1960).

apparent preference and buy the French Mirage. The Dutch have already ordered new Northrop F-5s.

* NATO collaboration in other areas may have its "spillover" into training. It has been announced that Belgium, The Netherlands, and Germany will jointly build and operate a school to train operators, maintenance personnel, and computer programmers for the new cooperative NATO air defense system known as NADGE. *Military Review*, March 1966, p. 102.

** *NATO Letter*, February 1965.

As we have noted before, NATO does little more than act as a clearing house to advise nations that have either surplus training facilities or excess students to be trained. There is no evidence that NATO has solicited nations to increase capacities or to seek spaces elsewhere, but the organization has acted as a go-between when nations have approached it first.

NATO has, with one exception, avoided setting standards for individual performance. The exception was the Air Training Advisory Group (ATAG) established in 1952 "to help nations achieve the required standard of pilot training" * Lord Ismay spoke optimistically of ATAG teams that would visit flying training centers throughout NATO to evaluate the quality of instruction and to suggest improvements. The ATAG was first assigned to the Standing Group, but was transferred in 1954 to the Air Inspection Directorate of the Air Deputy, SHAPE. By 1955 it had been reduced in size and reassigned to the Organization and Training Division and in 1962 it was abolished, apparently without its functions being conferred on any other agency.

The ATAG episode epitomizes the NATO experience. When training programs are broadly deficient, a little advice and guidance can spur great advances, but once a reasonable level of proficiency has been reached, the marginal utility of every incremental improvement declines in relation to cost. Nations do not like to be prodded by international inspectors to make training improvements that they probably recognize as desirable but not essential -- and which also cost money and effort. Officials do not say so in so many words, but apparently the ATAG came to outlive its usefulness when its recommendations began to irritate national authorities.

NATO in its corporate sense has operated only two schools for individuals: the NATO Defense College, and a communications school at Latina, Italy. The NATO Defense College, which was recently transferred to Rome from Paris when France withdrew from integrated status, illustrates both the benefits and drawbacks of collective training. NATO enthusiasts are understandably proud of the college, which has produced more than 1300 graduates who have been trained as

* See Ref. 11, p. 80.

international staff officers and imbued with an exalted sense of community purpose. The associations formed there doubtless make for better harmony among staff officers of different nations.

On the other hand, as with most international agencies, the Defense College is overstaffed by national standards. The college employs a permanent administrative and instructional staff of 125, exclusive of housekeeping personnel, to teach two classes a year of 54 students each.* Language instruction and the need for interpreters are important among the reasons for this high instructor-to-student ratio.

There also seems some reason to doubt that the caliber of the instruction at the college is on a par with national institutions. The pace of instruction must be sedate enough to allow those students with low comprehension in both English and French to keep up. From the published accounts of the curriculum one gets an impression of a rather bland mixture of fraternization and polite discussion -- a "gentleman's course."** One would expect that the training of a NATO staff officer would include a solid grounding in strategy, but even in the halcyon days strategy was so controversial it could only be discussed in generalities. With a mixed-nationality audience, faculty and guest speakers do not care to tackle sensitive subjects.

The respect that nations have for the NATO Defense College can be judged by their disposition of its graduates: less than half are posted to NATO headquarters at the completion of the course;*** only a small additional fraction are assigned to NATO-related positions in national organizations. Furthermore, graduates are less likely to be promoted than their contemporaries.****

The NATO Defense College was designed to foster standardization

* Colonel Richard Stillman, "NATO Defense College," *Military Review*, January 1964.

** *Ibid.*

*** *NATO Military Education Conference and Basic Planning Data*, SHAPE, Paris, France, 1962, p. 66.

**** For a balanced appraisal of the college, see Laurence I. Radway, "Military Behavior in International Organizations - NATO's

at the upper staff levels of the international hierarchy; the communications school at Latina was born with a different objective. The latter's purpose is to train operators and technicians for the ACE-HIGH communications system which now interconnects the NATO and national headquarters. The school graduates 200 pupils a year.

A number of factors converged to necessitate the establishment of the communications school. In the first place, the alliance, acting as a corporation, owns and operates the ACE-HIGH system as a community undertaking; SHAPE has become, in this instance, the "16th NATO nation" that manages the system and the school.* Mock-ups and test equipment were scarce, trained instructors were difficult to find, and a common technique had to be used at all stations. International schooling was also facilitated by the fact that English was selected as the common tongue to be used in the communications system, which meant that all trainees must be fluent in one language, whether or not they attended a consolidated school.

Latina has been a solid success. Even those officials who have been disturbed by the numerous administrative problems encountered admit that the task could hardly be done in any other way. But the Latina experience leads one to question whether consolidated training would be worthwhile under other circumstances. Quarters, meals, and other living standards will always present annoyances in a combined facility where Americans, Greeks, French, Norwegians, and Turks subsist side by side. Even the school regulations in disciplinary matters present a crazy-quilt pattern that has to be lived with -- not resolved.

As in most technical schools, the caliber of the Latina product varies directly with the quality of the input. Some of the students sent by the nations to take the course have been deficient in basic skill, intelligence, or language comprehension. Yet the school

Defense College," *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1962.

* The "16th nation" analogy was suggested by the head of SHAPE's Communications and Electronics Division. Major General F. W. Moorman, "ACE-HIGH IS an Infrastructure Project," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, No. 18, undated.

authorities have not been completely free to reject these trainees, for this would only result in empty seats for that class. A school operated under national auspices could deal more forcefully with this type of issue than could one that was ultimately dependent on the goodwill of the national authorities with whom it would remonstrate.

Instructors also present a problem. The pay of international civil servants is generally lower than that for comparable jobs in the more developed nations. NATO regulations, which call for sliding salaries according to the standard of living of the location, result in pay scales for Italy that are lower than those in the more industrialized countries of Western Europe. In 1965 the school was unable to attract qualified American instructors, despite the fact that the equipment was of American origin.

RESUME

NATO experience with individual training parallels that for units. The international organization has operated two consolidated institutions. These have surmounted a legion of problems but they have not stimulated much enthusiasm for an expanded program. One can deduce that a collective school has proved practical only when it involves small classes, scarce or expensive training equipment or instructors, and students who are proficient in one of the more common languages such as English or French.

In spite of what would appear to be opportunities to save on equipment and instructor overhead through the establishment of consolidated schools for instruction on maintenance and operation of common items of new equipment, there is no evidence of a trend in this direction. Some probable reasons for this will be taken up in a subsequent chapter.

The international structure appears to have discarded the idea of attempting to set standards for individual performance. The single effort in this direction, the ATAG, was phased down and finally abandoned in 1962. The concept has not been revived in other fields.

Finally, in the field of stimulating collaboration between nations, NATO is less active than it was ten years ago. This, of course, does

not mean that nations collaborate less. Many cross-border relationships have been set up and are working smoothly. For one reason or another, however, the international structure does not occupy the central monitoring position that many visualized for it in the early days of the alliance.

VI. ANALYSIS OF TRENDS

ALLOCATION OF EFFORT

The preceding three chapters suggest that the activities of the international structure have declined for all aspects of training except exercises and maneuvers. In some instances this reflects a shortfall against expectations rather than a decrease in physical activity, but in either case, the trend has significance for our study of the international-national relationship. If the conclusion is valid, we would expect it to be reflected in the reallocation of manpower to other assignments.

In SACLANT's headquarters, the assignment of personnel to the training task has remained fairly constant: approximately six spaces in a total staff of about 150. As noted in the second chapter, SACLANT's mission deals mainly with maneuvers. Where SACLANT has been concerned with setting standards, he has from the beginning interpreted this function in the least authoritative manner. Instead of specifying the type and amount of training required of the naval forces earmarked for assignment to him -- which would also require inspections to see that these directives are carried out -- SACLANT merely prescribes that these forces be able to perform certain combat functions when they report to his command. He leaves it to the national commanders to prepare their contingents to perform.

As a consequence, most of the personnel in the training section of SACLANT are involved in the planning, implementation, and analysis of maneuvers. Since maneuvers are intended to simulate real conditions, the routine work is done by the regular members of the staff, and the training section can be kept at a minimum number of people. (This is not to belittle the training task. Merely planning and supervising the numerous exercises is a difficult task, and it is generally recognized that the training section works harder than most other segments of a staff.)

SACEUR originally attempted a different relationship with national officials -- probably because his mission appeared more comprehensive --

and this undoubtedly accounts for the different pattern traced by the personnel allocations in SHAPE. In the early days, the Organization and Training Division (O&T) of SHAPE was one of the six major sections and was assigned approximately 40 officers from a total headquarters strength of approximately 400. It was headed by a senior major general. He served directly under the supervision of the deputy SACEUR, at that time Field Marshal Montgomery, who considered it one of his prime functions to visit member nations and inspect their training programs.

The O&T division gradually diminished in strength and importance until 1962 when it was disbanded. Insofar as any of its previous responsibilities can be identified in the present structure of SHAPE, they reside with the Combat Readiness Branch of the Operations Division, composed of approximately 10 officers. Of course, various other members of the SHAPE staff deal with training matters, but the decline in emphasis between 1955 and 1965 is still substantial.

Several operational factors have contributed to this gradual transition. First, national forces need less guidance now than they did ten years ago. Second, with the establishment of standard training criteria, and with the experience gained through numerous exercises, much of the training task has become routine. Third, some of the workload has been delegated to the major subordinate commanders, who are now much better organized than they were at the beginning of NATO. This latter development accounts for only minor manpower reductions in SHAPE, however, because in the summer of 1965, AAFCE, the most active subordinate command in the training field, also abolished its training section.

These differing patterns as between the headquarters of SACEUR and SACLANT tend to confirm our previous deductions. SACLANT, whose primary function has been to conduct exercises, has devoted a constant share of his manpower resources to training; SACEUR, having met with little success in his attempts to coordinate training in other areas, has reallocated the bulk of his training personnel to other tasks and concentrated the remainder in the maneuver function. Incidentally, the student of organization who has often been told

that bureaucratic empires are seldom dismantled after their purpose has been served should take heart at the evidence that SHAPE has been flexible enough to abolish what was probably the second most prestigious segment of the staff when it became clear that the results did not warrant the continued expenditure of resources.

CENTRALIZATION OR DECENTRALIZATION

In essence, the question confronted by SACEUR in his dealings with the nations has been whether or not to centralize under international control those aspects of training that could be operated in a decentralized manner. Opinion on this subject was divided even within the SHAPE staff. Some felt that SACEUR should exploit the vagueness of the NATO mission assignments to take over direction of any activity not specifically prohibited to him. Others believed that individual and unit training should remain a national responsibility and that SACEUR should stay aloof from the thorny problems of consolidation, standardization, or basic training criteria.

This dichotomy is summarized in a curious document published by the SHAPE staff in 1962.* The pamphlet describes the internal staff dispute that took place regarding a proposed conference of national educators to discuss officer training. The proponents of this meeting argued that SACEUR had an obligation to help nations standardize and improve all phases of training, including the education of individuals. Specifically, they argued that "if the alliance professes a need for a common cause, common tactics, common strategy, common equipment, and common organization, in these times when no nation can act alone, then it is obvious that these common factors cannot survive or even exist if the institutions of this alliance do not comprehend or give credence to these common needs."**

The opponents questioned whether the mandate existed. They were more skeptical about what SACEUR could do, and even questioned

* *NATO Military Education Conference and Basic Planning Dita*, SHAPE, Paris, France, 1962.

** *Ibid.*, p. 3.

whether he had an obligation to act. The vigor with which they opposed the meeting suggests they were not merely concerned with the minor cost involved in holding the meeting (the expenses of the delegates would be paid by the nations). Evidently they harbored some basic aversion to centralization -- or possibly, on the contrary, they believed that a failure by SACEUR to bring order out of chaos would discredit him and make more difficult other attempts to centralize. Certainly, their main objection seems inadequate: they argued that "the general objectives and levels of instruction at the national [military] colleges vary so widely that it would be unfruitful to bring together the directors."^{*}

This same debate recurs throughout the history of SACEUR's efforts to coordinate individual and unit training. The answer seems to have evolved pragmatically. In the example cited above the conference was held; the delegates exchanged views and felt the meeting was useful; they passed a resolution calling for a permanent coordinating committee at SHAPE; they recommended a similar conference be held regularly every two years.^{**} But the concrete results were disappointing. It appeared that little could be done to improve or standardize within the resources available to SACEUR. So far as is known, none of the major recommendations of the meeting were implemented. With fewer people on his staff now involved in the training function, it seems unlikely that SACEUR will ever become the centralized director that many had visualized and hoped for in the early phases of NATO.

^{*}Ibid., p. 7.

^{**}This conference and the conflict of attitudes is also discussed by the project officer, Colonel R. V. Ritchey, USAF, in a series of three articles in consecutive issues of *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, beginning in the December-January 1962 issue.

VII. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON COLLABORATION

INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES

We have noted the trends that have been followed by the nations toward cooperation in some activities and independent action in others. What do they indicate in the way of reasons for or against collective activity?

First, one must note several developments that might lead to less emphasis on centralized training. The Western European allies no longer view the threat of Soviet attack in Europe with the same apprehension they felt in the early 1950s. (Actually, they spend more on defense now, but they feel less compulsion to combine with neighbors.) Then, too, the more professional standing armies of today need less training than did the ragtag collections of the early 1950s. A substitution in certain missions of missiles for aircraft, plus the retention of career pilots, has reduced the need for training aircrew members, which was one of the prime areas for potential collaboration in the 1950s. Finally, the national defense establishments are now well organized and feel less dependent on international aid or supervision; much collaboration is conducted directly between countries, thus bypassing the international structure.*

Conversely, however, one can see several reasons why cooperative programs should have more appeal today than in the past. Fifteen years ago the national forces were equipped with heterogeneous collections of British, American, French, and German equipment left over from World War II or before. Now most countries in Europe use common weapons such as the Nike and Hawk missiles and the F-104 aircraft. (The switch is not complete, however; Britain uses none of these weapons systems.)

* While it does not follow that collective activity will trace the same pattern for all functions, it would seem that the high water mark for centralization has been passed. Deutsch has remarked "European integration has slowed since the mid-1950s and has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957-1958." Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary," *American Political Science Review*, June 1966.

For another thing, Europeans must now buy most of the training that was provided free in the early 1950s by Canada and the United States. Presumably, Europeans are interested in securing the training as economically as possible. One would assume, therefore, that they would look to collaborative undertakings as a means of reducing costs.

We can identify three different ways that SACEUR has gone about the task of coordinated training. These approaches have involved: (1) standardizing procedures and setting minimum training criteria, (2) assisting nations to help each other, and (3) operating consolidated facilities. We should look at the results in each of these categories.

Standardization, as one might expect, was a far more comprehensive activity in the early years of the alliance than later. We have noted the example of the fighter pilot and the ground controller, an operation in which a certain amount of standardization was a *sine qua non* for operational effectiveness. Even if changes involved some expense and inconvenience, nations were willing to conform because the payoffs were so great. A certain amount of standardization was introduced automatically with the acquisition of common weapons. But once the essential steps were taken, nations became more reluctant to make changes for the sake of uniformity when the alterations required from them involved a symbolic or physical cost incommensurate with the benefits that would accrue.

Conditions differ widely throughout the alliance, as we have noted, and it is not feasible for every nation to adopt standards used by most others. This is particularly noticeable in regard to minimum training criteria or operating procedures. Equipment used in Norway, even if it is the same basic article as that used in Turkey, must be handled in a different manner. Pilots must be taught different procedures in Norway and their training should be oriented toward the acquisition of different proficiencies.

Thus, it is understandable that the task of standardizing has become less burdensome today -- and at the same time, offers SACEUR less opportunity to incite collective action -- than in the beginning.

One should expect that nations will continue to focus on the peculiarities of their individual positions and refuse to standardize except when collective action fits their particular need.

The second phase of activity, stimulating mutual assistance among the members, is another task in which success reduces the volume of business. SACEUR might, if he had chosen to follow this route, have made his headquarters a valuable clearing house for inter-nation collaboration. No one seems to know whether he deliberately chose not to strive for centralization, or whether the nations made that decision for him. In any event, as time wore on, international agents entered less and less into negotiations between nations. It is fair to conclude, on the evidence available, that the members are satisfied with the degree of assistance they give and receive. Apparently, they do not expect more of the international structure; they would probably resist a movement toward centralization under international aegis.

The greatest controversy has arisen over the role of the international structure in directing a consolidated NATO effort. Many NATO enthusiasts have urged an expanded program of amalgamated institutions.* But national authorities, who must be convinced in order for any program to be implemented, have held back. Why?

Fundamentally, it must be acknowledged, consolidated enterprises do not offer the tremendous savings over independent ventures that many seem to expect. The advocates have argued that better instructors, selected from the larger pool of availables, would raise the caliber of instruction. Fewer sets of training equipment would be required, because larger classes would insure maximum utilization. Reductions in equipment and manpower overhead would result in less cost per trainee.

But apparently such economies of scale are elusive in international training ventures. Language presents a problem except where students

*See, for example, *Western European Union Assembly Report*, 1961, p. 27, which recommends a wide expansion of the NATO Defense College and further "harmonization" of the study programs of the national military academies.

come from the upper educational levels and have already been taught second languages. Transportation to, and subsistence at, centralized facilities raises costs. Internationalization itself introduces duplication of assignments and militates against economy. All of these costs are magnified politically by a foreign exchange factor. Nations often prefer to spend \$2 at home than \$1 abroad.

Nonetheless, conditions often exist whereby it appears that consolidated training would substantially reduce the unit cost. Why do nations refuse to collaborate when it appears to be to their advantage to do so?

First we should understand that, though the average unit cost may be reduced in combined ventures, this may still be more than some countries are willing to pay. When it is necessary to skimp on military expenditures, training -- which can be readily increased or decreased without affecting the size and outward appearance of the forces -- usually suffers disproportionately large cuts. Thus, an economizing nation will retain the same number of aircraft in its inventory but cut back on the training for aircrews and maintenance personnel. Hence, countries are wary of a long-term commitment to an international program in which they would be obligated to continue paying upkeep costs even if they should decide to curtail training.

The mechanics of marginal cost-sharing negotiations also hamper collectivization. Olson and Zeckhauser have shown that when marginal cost sharing, or common funding under negotiated arrangements, is used as a basis of financing collective ventures, smaller nations tend to pay a higher percentage of the total cost than they do in those activities in which each nation determines its own goals.* Thus Italy's defense budget, which is determined in Rome, comprises only 2.27 percent of what all the allies spend on defense. But Italy's share of the infrastructure fund, which was negotiated by all allies in Paris, runs to 5.97 percent of the total.**

* Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, *An Economic Theory of Alliances*, The RAND Corporation, RM-4297-ISA, October 1966.

** This peculiarity of community financing is more thoroughly explained in the author's RM-5282-PR (see Ref. 13).

Infrastructure products have a high public-good component. They are designed that way -- to provide for the common defense. Training products lean heavily in the other direction, toward a private good. The prevalent assumption has been that collective training projects would be easier to generate for this reason. Yet it can be seen that, if Italian troops make up one-tenth of the student load -- which they probably would, given the size and equipment of the Italian establishment -- Italy would be expected to contribute even more toward a collective school than it does to infrastructure. Of course, some countries might gain proportionately, but a community venture thrives, not because a number of nations favor it, but rather because none (or only a few) is adamantly opposed.

With the single exception of Germany, the poorer countries of Europe maintain the larger armies and air forces (and hence have the most troops to be trained). It follows, therefore, that cost-sharing formulas based on pro rata allocations according to the number of troops or units trained will result in relatively higher charges to the poorer countries. It is more than coincidental that the NAMFI missile range project, whose operating costs will be apportioned according to the amount of use by each country, includes only one of the four NATO nations with per capita income of less than \$1000 per year, although all four are equipped with Nike and Hawk missiles.* The exception is Greece, the host nation, which stands to profit considerably in its foreign exchange position and from the stimulus to the local economy.

In short, the fact that training produces private goods may hinder, not stimulate, combined enterprises. The wealthier nations can often be persuaded to subsidize public-good activities such as infrastructure, but they are less willing to make contributions that are obviously out of line with benefits received in a venture to which a logical measurement of gains can be applied.

In two of the three consolidated training programs that have developed directly under NATO, scarcity of equipment or facilities

* The eight participants are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, The Netherlands, Norway, and the United States. *The Times*, London, June 3, 1964.

apparently played a part. The examples are few: Latina, NAMFI range, NATO Defense College, compared to the numerous opportunities that would seem to exist. In the case of Latina, equipment was so scarce that a set had to be diverted from a critical operational station. The NAMFI range came into existence because no adequate facility existed east of Fort Bliss, Texas. The establishment of the NATO Defense College cannot be attributed to scarce space, equipment, or instructors, but it is the only institution where combined staff procedures are taught.

RELATIONSHIP OF EXPERIENCE TO THEORY

The evidence is not conclusive, but in general the training experience tends to confirm the power-politics or "utilitarian" concept of a nation's behavior in alliances. If there have been instances of unselfish action on behalf of the community, these have been vastly outnumbered by the multitude of cases in which nations have failed to act collectively because of the objections of one or more who would have been required to make a sacrifice. No pronounced propensity to act in common is to be discerned.

One exception might possibly be the generous Canadian and American donations of free training during the 1950s. Certainly these contributions were uncompensated in terms of physical or short-run returns to the donors. But it does not detract from the magnanimity of these acts to argue that it was in the American and Canadian interest to shore up Western European defenses during the reconstruction period.*

* American spokesmen have often admitted the motive of self-interest in U.S. contributions to NATO, in part to justify the burden imposed on U.S. taxpayers and in part to elicit greater contributions from other nations in the common cause. General Eisenhower, for example, asserted that "the unit of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing -- the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation." *Annual Report to the Standing Group, NATO*, April 2, 1952, p. 7. More recently, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Mr. Harlan Cleveland, was quoted as saying, "There is a temptation . . . to give the United States credit for generosity, goodwill, and altruism, when in reality her interest in partnership is a self-serving one." Anne Sington, *NATO Letter*, April 1966.

The manner in which these programs were undertaken sheds some light on motives. American training, in particular, presented a splendid opportunity to initiate and stimulate a collective training system in Europe. For various reasons, primarily expediency, the United States did not follow this course. "Third country" training, as it is called, has never been highly regarded in Washington. One can hardly criticize this attitude. The United States was already operating a number of established training schools in the Western Hemisphere which could handle the load; students could be brought here with less time delay and at less cost than would have been involved in setting up duplicate facilities in Europe. Besides, as Secretary McNamara has stated, the exposure of foreign students to American political traditions and philosophy helped to spread an understanding of democracy.*

Later, when the United States changed to a reimbursable system for most European countries, the training of foreign military students became a source of recoulement for capital investments in training facilities that had become surplus to American needs. It seems impossible, given the intangibles, to determine whether the United States sold this training at a loss. Certainly no attempt was made to make a profit on it. Still later, when the balance of payments became a concern to the Pentagon, training in America offered a means of improving the foreign exchange position, whereas Americans in training at a combined installation in Europe (like the NAMFI range) represent a drain.

While NATO nations appear to have been reluctant, for historical as well as financial reasons, they do not seem to have any philosophical aversion to collaboration. In many cases, it turns out that the presumed financial and material advantages of collective action disappear under close examination, at least from the viewpoint of some individual countries. Very few instances have been discovered in which everyone would gain more than the project would cost him.

* Hearings, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1962*, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 61 and 77.

Even when training could be accomplished at a cheaper unit cost to all, some countries reckon this cost is more than they want to pay -- or might have to pay under some alternate multilateral arrangement.

The future of collective training is unpredictable. Opportunities for fruitful collaboration seem to exist unabated, what with the continued scarcity of land, the need for expensive mock-ups, and the trend toward acquisition of common types of new weapons. It appears, however, that membership in collective enterprises will continue to be developed only on a selective basis, and there is no evidence that the formula for inducing collaboration has yet been discovered.

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10. ABSTRACT A survey of NATO coordination of training programs for allied military forces and its implications about collaboration among allies in peacetime. Of the three types of training analyzed--"higher training" (co-ordination of large military formations), "unit training" of smaller teams, and specialized "individual training"--NATO authorities have achieved greatest success in "higher training." The forces of the member nations work harmoniously, and combined exercises and maneuvers have steadily increased in number and sophistication. In unit and individual training, however, NATO's role is much more limited, and the nations have preferred to retain separate programs. This lack of collaboration owes not to ineffectual NATO leadership but to NATO's legal and economic impotence and the dominance of national self-interest. Nations have found it economically disadvantageous to collectivize unit and individual training programs. NATO's experience in the training function tends to confirm the utilitarian concept of a nation's behavior in alliances. Where national self-interest is served--because of scarcity of an essential commodity or strategic necessity--cooperation is willingly engaged in. Where cooperation involves a sacrifice for the common welfare, it is declined.	11. KEY WORDS NATO Alliances International Relations Political Science Military organization Military operations Europe Atlantic countries	